MR TREVOR NCUBE ON THE WAY FORWARD!

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Outside Zimbabwe, the countries that have imposed sanctions are seen as having vested interests and therefore not impartial when it comes to understanding and resolving the Zimbabwean crisis. At worst, many Africans have seen the sanctions as a white racist response to land reform in Zimbabwe.

The following is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Trevor Ncube, publisher of the Zimbabwe Independent and the Standard, also the Chief Executive of the Mail & Guardian Media Group (South Africa). The speech was delivered in London on September 18, 2007. The Oppenheimer Lecture, organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, was on the theme: "Towards a New Zimbabwe: Challenges and Opportunities".

ALTHOUGH the Zimbabwean crisis has preoccupied the attention of opposition parties, civil society activists, global policymakers and researchers, particularly since 2000 when President Robert Mugabe’s Zanu PF government embarked on controversial land seizures, there has been between little and no focus on viable solutions to end the crisis beyond condemning and demonizing Mr. Mugabe and his misrule.

While the Zimbabwean crisis is now widening and deepening in every respect, the continued focus on the description of the crisis at the expense of finding and mapping out solutions to that crisis is now generating widespread fatigue, cynicism and even resignation among Zimbabweans and some concerned sections of the international community.

It now appears that the more the Zimbabwean crisis worsens the more Mr Mugabe and his Zanu PF government become entrenched in power.

I believe the time has come for those concerned about the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe to take a leaf from the Chinese language which depicts the word crisis with two characters: one denoting danger and the other representing opportunity.
Much as the situation in Zimbabwe is replete with dangers arising from the political and economic meltdown in that country, the very same meltdown is creating opportunities for change. Sadly, while the dangers have become common cause, the opportunities have remained unexamined.

Against this background, and in the interest of shifting the focus of our debate and policy action on Zimbabwe away from crisis-description to crisis-resolution, I propose to share with you what I believe are four opportunities that need our collective attention in the hope that we can zero in on one or all of them to facilitate the much needed positive change in Zimbabwe.

In my view, the following opportunities to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis are now in the air and one of them is most likely if not certain to carry the day within the next six or so months depending on the actions of those like us here who are concerned about bringing the rot in Zimbabwe to an urgent end:

Following the split of the MDC in October 2005, along with growing divisions within the ruling Zanu PF over Mugabe’s stalled succession and the disenchantment of neutrals across the political divide, there are now serious indications that a Third Way is finally emerging through what promises to be a united opposition front comprising nationalist progressives who believe in the virtues and gains of the liberation struggle, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

Along with Mugabe’s own exit preparations, there are very strong indications that the Zanu PF faction led by Retired General Solomon Mujuru is actively preparing to use the ruling party’s December special congress to force Mugabe out of power through a palace coup that would see the elevation of Vice President Joyce Mujuru or a dark horse such as former Finance Minister Dr Simba Makoni.

There are very serious but unnoticed indications that President Mugabe is actively preparing to exit by the end of the year in which he would anoint a successor, now once again believed to be Emmerson Mnangagwa, at his party’s special congress that has been called for December 2007.

There are also indications that instead of using his party’s special December congress to anoint a successor, and aware of the factional plotting by the Mujuru group that appears determined to oust him, Mugabe will seek and receive an endorsement from the special congress as Zanu PF’s presidential candidate in the harmonised presidential, parliamentary and local government elections in 2008.
Let us take a closer look at each of these opportunities.

THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY

It is common cause that since the beginning of the year, President Mugabe has made it clear that he wants to seek re-election after his current presidential term expires in March 2008 when he would be 84 years old. Indeed, he has thus far been mobilising various Zanu PF affiliated groups, especially among the ranks of the youth, women and liberation war veterans, to endorse and support his controversial candidacy.

But how is Mugabe’s determination to seek reelection an opportunity for change? It seems to me that Mugabe’s determination to seek reelection is also a ploy by him to find what his supporters have defined as a “dignified exit”—a short hand for an exit that would guarantee Mugabe immunity after his departure. An election could end up as a disaster for him should he be humiliated at the polls and be left without immunity thereafter.

So far, those opposed to Mugabe have responded by merely condemning Mugabe as being power hungry and wanting to cling onto power in order to remain in office for life. While Mugabe’s determination to remain in office for life, and the brutality associated with that determination, is indeed a central part of the Zimbabwean crisis, it is not enough to merely make this observation without also critically examining the reasons behind his determination.
After 27 years of misrule, ten of which were under the extended Rhodesian state of emergency that institutionalised brutality and unaccountability in Zimbabwe’s governance between 1980 and 1990, Mugabe has accumulated too many human rights skeletons in his political cupboard, particularly but not only those skeletons arising from four tragedies that have stood out over the years including:

• The Gukurahundi atrocities between 1981 and 1987 during which more than 20,000 people were massacred while many more were tortured and others lost their sources of livelihood.

• The torture, murder and forcibly removal of former white commercial farmers and their farm workers between 2000 and 2005.

• The consequences of Operation Murambatsvina (or so-called Operation Restore Order) in 2005 when some 18% of the population was displaced as a result of the destruction of its homes and sources of livelihood.

• The torture, murder and disappearance of opposition and civic society activists during presidential and parliamentary campaigns at the hands of state and ruling party agents since 1985.

There is no doubt that these Zimbabwean tragedies, among others, have left Mugabe vulnerable and liable to prosecution on allegations of crimes against humanity. As such, it should be obvious that a driving force behind Mugabe’s determination to cling onto power and remain in office for life is his fear of losing immunity of and from the office. His fear has been made even more real by the experiences of former Liberian President Charles Taylor, former Zambian President Frederick Chiluba facing various prosecutions related to alleged abuses when they were in office.

In my view, without condoning his abuses at all which will have to be addressed in the fullness of time through a two or three steps transitional process, I believe that Mugabe’s immunity fears provide us an opportunity to structure and facilitate his exit in a creative way that would minimise if not eliminate resistance from him and his staunch supporters in the security forces.

One possibility in this regard, which I see as an immense opportunity for reform, would be to persuade Mugabe to drop his reelection bid and to accept a constitutional amendment, possibly as part of the 18th constitutional amendment bill now before Parliament, abolishing the executive presidency in favour of a titular presidency with an executive Prime Minister.

In this arrangement, Mugabe would become a non executive president elected by Parliament for a five year term from 2008 when his current term expires to 2013. Effectively, this would address Mugabe’s immunity concerns without debating it—something which Mugabe does not want to entertain—while also allowing a meaningful transitional process to begin in Zimbabwe.

The same Parliament would elect a consensus Prime Minister to lead a consensus government of all national talents from 2008 to 2010 when a general election would be due following the expiry of the tenure of the current Parliament. The two year period before the general election would thus be the transitional period for implementing the much needed far reaching political, constitutional and economic reforms that would renew and regenerate Zimbabwe while bringing it back into the community of nations.

THE SECOND OPPORTUNITY

If for whatever reasons the first opportunity does not materialise, I see a second opportunity coming in three months at the Zanu PF special congress in December.
The second opportunity would be a variation of the first. After facing sustained opposition from the ruling party faction led by Retired Major General Solomon Mujuru, Mugabe has over the last few months been renewing his relationship with his former minister for national security, and now minister of rural housing and social amenities, Emmerson Mnangagwa, who leads a competing faction.

Although he was humiliated and sidelined ahead of the Zanu PF last congress in 2004 after losing the party’s vice presidency to Joice Mujuru—wife to Solomon Mujuru—Mnangagwa has been slowly recovering and reemerging as a power base again this time by lending his faction’s support to Mugabe’s reelection bid.

On his part, Mugabe has been encouraging Mnangagwa by once again making indications that he is his chosen successor. An obvious reason for this is the presumption that, because he was security minister during the Gukurahundi massacres, Mnangagwa has common prosecution fears over allegations of crimes against humanity and would thus protect Mugabe as a matter of self interest.

The growing talk within the Mnangagwa camp, and also from intelligence sources in Zimbabwe, is that Mugabe has called for a special congress of his party in December, which was not due until 2009, in order to publicly use it to anoint Mnangagwa as his successor.

What remains unclear is whether Mugabe would allow Mnangagwa to takeover the party leadership in December and move on to be the Zanu PF presidential candidate should elections be held in 2008 or whether Mugabe would still insist on running for reelection with a promise that Mnangagwa would takeover a year or two after the 2008 elections should Mugabe win. However, what is clear is that Mnangagwa’s camp prefers the latter not least because it does not trust Mugabe would give up power after the elections should he win.

The fact that the Mnangagwa camp does not trust Mugabe, who unceremoniously ditched it in 2004 in favour of Joice Mujuru, means that Mugabe will go to the special congress in December without assured political support.

This creates an opportunity for change through a “soft surprise” at the special congress as happened in December 2006 when delegates “surprisingly” rejected Mugabe’s bid to postpone presidential elections to 2010 in the hope of remaining in office as executive president until then elected by Parliament without facing the electorate.
What this means is that at the December special congress, Mugabe will be manifestly opposed by the Mujuru faction and latently opposed by the Mnangagwa faction. Such a political climate could pave way for a dark horse to emerge as a compromise candidate. It is hard to say who that candidate could be at the moment although Simba Makoni’s name keeps coming up.

Alternatively, the same political scenario engendered by manifest opposition to Mugabe from the Mujuru camp and latent opposition from the Mnangagwa faction could cause Mugabe to accept the first opportunity described above.

But the possibility of a “soft surprise” development at the special Zanu PF congress in December would obviously need to be socially-engineered taking advantage of clear and present political dynamics on the ground ahead of the congress.

My view is that progressive forces in and outside Zimbabwe could play a pivotal role to encourage if not to engineer that development by working with strategic Zanu PF elements. That would be far better than simply mourning about the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe and denouncing Mugabe for wanting to remain in office for life.

THE THIRD OPPORTUNITY

In addition to an opportunity of the possibility of a “soft surprise” at the special Zanu PF congress in December, that could see the emergence of a compromise candidate to replace Mugabe, there is also a third opportunity that would be in the form of a “hard surprise” through a palace coup led by the Mujuru camp.

In recent months, the Mujuru camp has been making it clear to anyone who cares to listen that they want Mugabe out. Early this year when the Zanu PF central committee was reported to have endorsed Mugabe’s reelection bid, the Mujuru camp started openly calling for a special congress at the end of the year to settle the leadership question in the ruling party.

The fact that Mugabe has now called for that special congress can indeed be seen as a victory for the Mujuru camp because it has all along since March this year badly needed the special congress. Already, the Mujuru camp is very busy on the ground organising the ten Zanu PF provinces and asking them to identify individuals they think could be presidential candidates to replace Mugabe. This is being done openly.
It seems that the plan is to use the special congress in December to achieve two objectives:

• First to challenge and even humiliate Mugabe by making it clear that he is not the sole Zanu PF presidential candidate as several provinces would come up with competing names.

• Second to force a nomination election by secret even open ballot which the Mujuru camp believes would be won by either Joice Mujuru or Simba Makoni.
Strategists in Mujuru’s camp believe that, should it become clear that such a nomination election is imminent, Mugabe would not want to be part of it as the writing would then be on the wall about his assured defeat.

THE FOURTH OPPORTUNITY

The above three opportunities are all available to the ruling party and thus dependent on what happens within it. Yet the Zimbabwean crisis is national in scope and options to its resolution are not limited to developments within the ruling part.
It should stand to reason that Zanu PF’s continued failure thus far to resolve the crisis creates an opportunity for the opposition. Unfortunately, the Zimbabwean opposition has not been able to exploit that opportunity due a range of structural and leadership weaknesses that are now well known and do not need to be repeated save to point out that as currently constituted the opposition does not have a chance in heaven to move Zimbabwe forward.

What is notable is that the three opportunities that are available within Zanu PF are potent material for a new progressive opposition with nationalist and democratic roots.

Rather than standing by and watching events unfold in Zanu PF, I believe progressive forces in Zimbabwe have an historic opportunity to forge a Third Way that would bring together elements from the ruling party, the two formations of the MDC, other opposition groups, civic society organisations, churches, labour unions, student movements and the business community to form Everyone’s party to dislodge Zanu PF.
Mugabe, and indeed Zanu PF, continues to define the opposition as the MDC. A major if not only reason why Mugabe continues to be determined to stand for reelection against all odds is that he believes he cannot lose to the MDC. He has not factored the possibility of facing a united front of progressive forces against which he and Zanu PF cannot win.

The grassroots sentiment in Zimbabwe today is in favour of the reconfiguration of political forces in Zanu PF, the MDC and among political neutrals towards a united front. The opportunity for such a front is huge beyond description.

Based on the unfolding developments in Zimbabwe, a united front could emerge overnight and takeoff like an unstoppable wave. The major barriers to the actualisation of a united front so far are the following:
• The challenge of identifying a unifying candidate with the leadership gravitas and mass appeal across the political divide.

• Continued support of factions within the MDC by sections of the international community that appear to be committed to particular individual leaders in the opposition.

• Sweeping, indiscriminate and counterproductive application of so-called targeted sanctions against Zanu PF politburo and central committee members as well as parliamentarians—now in some countries such as Australia including children of affected official.

These sanctions have failed to take advantage of reform opportunities such as those described above including exploiting the growing internal divisions within the ruling party. On the contrary, the effect of these sanctions has been to draw progressive Zanu PF politicians and officials closer to Mugabe and away from reform politics.

ON SANCTIONS

The Zimbabwean government has maintained that the targeted sanctions imposed by some Western countries after Mugabe's disputed victory in the 2002 presidential elections are illegal because they do not have the authority of the United Nations.
While it is true that the sanctions in question are not sanctioned by the United Nations, that alone cannot mean they are illegal. The countries which have imposed the sanctions have done so in accordance with their relevant laws. Besides, there is no international law, statute, convention or practice that has been violated by the sanctions.

Therefore the illegality or legality of the sanctions is in fact a non issue.
The real question is whether these sanctions are wise or whether they have achieved or are achieving any meaningful objective. My own view is that the sanctions are not wise and that they have not achieved any meaningful objective given the Zimbabwean crisis.

I believe they are not wise mainly because they have led to the diminishing of the capacity of the countries implementing them to influence events in Zimbabwe towards the much needed resolution of the crisis.

It seems to me that Western countries that have imposed declared or undeclared sanctions on Zimbabwe have done so less to deal with the deteriorating situation in that country and more to appease political constituencies at home who want some demonstrable action being taken by their governments often out of emotional rather than practical reasons.

Virtually all of the countries that have imposed declared or undeclared sanctions on Zimbabwe have since 2002 experienced a dramatic erosion of their diplomatic influence in and on Zimbabwe. Within Zimbabwe, diplomats of these countries have lost access to senior ruling party and government officials who have responded by boycotting diplomatic contact.

Outside Zimbabwe, the countries that have imposed sanctions are seen as having vested interests and therefore not impartial when it comes to understanding and resolving the Zimbabwean crisis. At worst, many Africans have seen the sanctions as a white racist response to land reform in Zimbabwe.
These and related considerations demonstrate, in my view, that the sanctions are not wise. As a result, the sanctions have been counterproductive.

In the first place, despite denials by the countries that have imposed them, these sanctions have in fact affected ordinary people beyond those they claim target. For example, the United States Zimbabwe Democracy Recovery Act (Zidera) specifically bars American representatives to the World Bank, the IMF, Africa Development Bank and other multilateral institutions not to support any loan, grant or concession to Zimbabwe.

In turn, this has exacerbated Zimbabwe's sovereign risk status and thus negatively affecting a range of bilateral lending to Zimbabwe including from the private sector. Zimbabwe has gone without balance of payment support for years. The consequence is felt by ordinary people across the economy.

As a result, Mugabe and the ruling Zanu PF party routinely present the sanctions as the root cause of the country's biting economic meltdown. The opposition and civic society groups in Zimbabwe have found this propaganda very difficult if not impossible to rebut.

Outside Zimbabwe, bodies such as Sadc and the African Union have found it extremely difficult to openly or publicly criticise Mugabe and the
policies of his Zanu PF government precisely because of the fear of being seen as either supporting the Western sanctions that are undeniably affecting ordinary people or being seen as puppets of the West.

WHAT THE WEST CAN DO

An impression has been created, at least in the media and diplomatic circles, that the only desirable or available options for the West revolve around taking tough action against Mugabe and his cronies through targeted sanctions including preventing Mugabe from attending global summits such as the Euro-Africa summit planned for Portugal in December.

In essence, the single strategy so far appears to be about isolating Mugabe and his regime from the international community. But as the experiences of Libya, North Korea and Iran are showing, isolationist policies have limited if any success. Ultimately, the best way of dealing with rogue regimes is by confronting them through diplomatic engagement. I must emphasise that there is a world of difference between engagement and support.

I therefore believe that the best that the West can do now is to re-engage the Zimbabwean government. After all, virtually all of the Western countries have embassies in Zimbabwe but those embassies are currently only useful for issuing visas to Zimbabweans who want to flee their country. Yet those embassies can do much better through diplomatic engagement.

While the content of the diplomatic engagement I am proposing would obviously vary from country to country, a leaf can be taken from the much maligned so-called quiet diplomacy pursued by South Africa.

I don't think there is any discerning observer who can argue that South Africa uncritically supports the policies of Mugabe and his Zanu PF government. Far from it.
Yet South Africa has considerable influence on Zimbabwe mainly due to the fact that it has remained engaged with the Zimbabwean government and other stakeholders. The current South African led SADC mandated mediation between the government of Zimbabwe, Zanu PF and the MDC is on the verge of yielding some positive outcome due to the patience of South African diplomacy.

In 1979 when Britain under Margaret Thatcher abandoned its aloofness and decided to become engaged with the frontline states, the liberation movement and the Rhodesian government, the result was the Lancaster agreement.

The current Zimbabwean crisis calls for a similar spirit of engagement and the four opportunities described in this presentation could be a strategic starting point.

THE UNKNOWN FACTORS

If all the above opportunities are not fully exploited then I am pessimistic about the future of Zimbabwe. To me failure to influence events towards the achievement of the above options means that we are then resigned to fate. I have two recurring nightmares in this regard namely a spontaneous uprising by the long suffering Zimbabwean public or anarchy that would follow the sudden death of President Mugabe.

Allow me to talk to these two nightmares in some brief detail;
The situation in Zimbabwe right now is fertile for a revolution except for the absence of a leadership to direct people’s anger towards something positive. The immense and inhuman hardships that they experience daily means that they need the smallest of reasons to embark on a spontaneous uprising. This is undesirable and could result in unimaginable consequences for Zimbabwe. These hardships include the acute shortage of water and electricity and the general shortage of all basic commodities such as fuel, bread, cooking oil, mealie meal which is a staple diet, salt and sugar.

Life is unbearable in Zimbabwe and I have no doubt that the ground swell of anger could easily bust into open revolt for something such as a fatality following a stampede for bread at a shopping complex. Indeed I venture to say defeat at the hands of a visiting football team could trigger such as spontaneous uprising. The danger with this is that once it starts it would be difficult to contain and there is no knowing what the underpaid and disgruntled police and military would do in such circumstances.

As indicated above President Mugabe’s wish is to die in office. I have nightmares about the impact that this power vacuum would create were this to happen ahead of a managed political transition. While this might sound alarmist right now it is a real possibility because Mr. Mugabe is not exactly a spring chicken and intelligence sources indicate that he is not well at all.

The two factions within Zanu PF would go for each other hammer and tongs following Mugabe’s death with a high possibility of a shooting war. This is so because the factionalism within Zanu PF has reproduced itself in the police, the army and the national intelligence. I pray all the time that these two nightmares never turn into reality for the sake of my beloved country. In fact these two dangers emphasize the urgency for some political leadership internally and from the international community to help bringing about a peaceful transition.

I am also concerned about the talk of an election boycott that is doing the rounds within the Morgan Tswangirai led MDC faction. There is support for this boycott from the Solomon Mujuru led Zanu PF faction. The argument goes that if Mugabe can not be persuaded not to stand in March then the opposition should boycott the elections whose main purpose would be to endorse and legitimize Mugabe. While I agree that Mugabe wants a victory at all costs so as to go out on a high I doubt that there is a clearly thought out Plan B that would ameliorate the negative consequences of this strategy. For the boycott to work the opposition in Zimbabwe must have Plan B that would include a rolling mass action or civil disobedience that would force Mugabe out of office. I doubt that there is such capacity in the opposition right now.

CONCLUSION

The time has come for everyone concerned about the Zimbabwean crisis to concentrate less on the negatives of describing the crisis and more on the positives of finding solutions to it. This is because Zimbabwe is indeed now pregnant with opportunities for change and yet those opportunities are not getting the attention they deserve and are thus going unnoticed and unsupported.

Instead of megaphone diplomacy and fixation over President Mugabe the international community should seek to work with Zanu PF moderates and all progressive forces in Zimbabwe to influence change that is rooted in the historical imperatives of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.